

Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Matter for Ratification?

Supplemental Information

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Appendix A: Robustness Checks

Table A1: Human rights treaty obligations and ratification, Cox models

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Demanding obligations | 0.989*** (0.001) | 0.989*** (0.001) | 0.986*** (0.001) | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.981*** (0.001) | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.983*** (0.001) |
| Democracy | 1.354*** (0.081) | 1.493*** (0.103) | 1.534*** (0.109) | 1.287*** (0.097) | 1.262** (0.116) | 1.236*** (0.096) | 1.234*** (0.096) |
| Democratic transition | 1.797*** (0.167) | 1.755*** (0.169) | 1.545*** (0.151) | 2.016*** (0.205) | 1.716*** (0.211) | 2.045*** (0.210) | 2.035*** (0.210) |
| Basic rights respected | | 0.952** (0.021) | 0.919*** (0.021) | 0.944** (0.022) | 0.910*** (0.025) | 1.026 (0.030) | 1.022 (0.028) |
| Global ratification rate | | | 1.012*** (0.002) | 1.012*** (0.002) | 1.012*** (0.002) | 1.013*** (0.002) | 1.012*** (0.002) |
| IGO memberships (ln) | | | | 1.514*** (0.085) | 0.898 (0.106) | 1.335*** (0.082) | 1.287*** (0.081) |
| INGO memberships (ln) | | | | | 1.260*** (0.072) | | |
| Population (ln) | | | | | | 1.087*** (0.022) | |
| Urban population (ln) | | | | | | | 1.087*** (0.019) |
| Observations | 25,188 | 23,706 | 23,706 | 23,502 | 16,137 | 23,502 | 23,498 |
| Country-treaty clusters | 1,867 | 1,861 | 1,861 | 1,849 | 1,455 | 1,849 | 1,849 |
| Number of ratifications | 1,396 | 1,356 | 1,356 | 1,349 | 966 | 1,349 | 1,349 |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -9274 | -8938 | -8900 | -8801 | -5803 | -8790 | -8784 |
| Wald chi square | 275.3 | 288.2 | 296.7 | 346.5 | 297.4 | 343.1 | 342.5 |

Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country-treaty.

Efron approximation used for tied failures.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table A2: Human rights treaty obligations and ratification, Cox models

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Demanding obligations | 0.977*** (0.002) | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.976*** (0.002) | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.984*** (0.001) | 0.983*** (0.001) |
| Democracy | 1.223** (0.101) | 1.241*** (0.100) | 1.220** (0.107) | 1.335*** (0.137) | 1.337*** (0.116) | 1.252*** (0.097) |
| Democratic transition | 1.904*** (0.213) | 1.955*** (0.216) | 1.848*** (0.221) | 1.970*** (0.211) | 1.532*** (0.205) | 2.112*** (0.217) |
| Basic rights respected | 0.969 (0.027) | 0.983 (0.028) | 0.982 (0.030) | 0.955 (0.027) | 1.022 (0.033) | 0.935** (0.025) |
| Global ratification rate | 1.020*** (0.002) | 1.012*** (0.002) | 1.017*** (0.002) | 1.011*** (0.002) | 1.012*** (0.002) | 1.012*** (0.002) |
| IGO memberships (ln) | 1.936*** (0.136) | 1.666*** (0.106) | 1.815*** (0.131) | 1.576*** (0.090) | 2.131*** (0.174) | 1.456*** (0.090) |
| GDP/capita (ln) | 0.990 (0.035) | 1.006 (0.035) | 0.986 (0.036) | 1.007 (0.035) | 0.937 (0.038) | 1.018 (0.035) |
| Already ratified ICCPR | 0.717*** (0.055) | | 1.177 (0.185) | | | |
| Already ratified ICESCR | | 0.613*** (0.046) | 0.686** (0.108) | | | |
| Judicial independence | | | | 0.863 (0.151) | | |
| Treaties incorporated | | | | | 1.604*** (0.113) | |
| Treaties equal or superior | | | | | | 1.134 (0.088) |
| Observations | 19,866 | 19,863 | 16,227 | 22,608 | 16,616 | 22,193 |
| Country-treaty clusters | 1658 | 1658 | 1467 | 1828 | 1512 | 1824 |
| Number of ratifications | 1187 | 1193 | 1031 | 1305 | 922 | 1303 |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -7586 | -7619 | -6476 | -8476 | -5608 | -8421 |
| Wald chi-square | 339.7 | 402.6 | 299.9 | 334.4 | 333.2 | 350.3 |

Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country-treaty.

Efron approximation used for tied failures.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table A3: Human rights treaty obligations and ratification, Cox models

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Demanding obligations | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.982*** (0.001) | 0.984*** (0.001) | 0.984*** (0.001) | 0.984*** (0.001) | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.983*** (0.001) | 0.984*** (0.001) |
| Democracy | 1.278*** (0.097) | 1.358*** (0.102) | 1.303*** (0.098) | 1.311*** (0.099) | 1.309*** (0.099) | 1.244*** (0.105) | 1.316*** (0.109) | 1.299*** (0.110) |
| Democratic transition | 2.044*** (0.208) | 1.844*** (0.187) | 2.127*** (0.215) | 2.081*** (0.213) | 1.955*** (0.198) | 1.911*** (0.226) | 1.966*** (0.233) | 1.683*** (0.216) |
| Basic rights respected | 0.939** (0.025) | 0.911*** (0.024) | 0.941** (0.025) | 0.944** (0.025) | 0.937** (0.025) | 0.994 (0.030) | 0.969 (0.028) | 0.926** (0.031) |
| Global ratification rate | 1.011*** (0.002) | 1.002 (0.002) | | | | 1.011*** (0.002) | 1.008*** (0.002) | 1.014*** (0.002) |
| IGO memberships (ln) | 1.501*** (0.088) | 1.255*** (0.075) | 1.349*** (0.097) | 1.363*** (0.099) | 1.346*** (0.095) | 1.651*** (0.130) | 1.618*** (0.139) | 1.635*** (0.150) |
| GDP/capita (ln) | 1.008 (0.033) | 1.033 (0.034) | 1.017 (0.034) | 1.014 (0.033) | 1.026 (0.034) | 0.974 (0.039) | 0.952 (0.036) | 0.943 (0.045) |
| After ICCPR but before end of Cold War | 0.819*** (0.059) | 1.293*** (0.126) | | | | | | |
| Post Cold War period | | 2.463*** (0.296) | | | | | | |
| Years since 1948 | | | 1.014*** (0.003) | 1.032*** (0.012) | 0.871*** (0.018) | | | |
| Years since 1948, squared | | | | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.005*** (0.001) | | | |
| Years since 1948, cubed | | | | | 1.000*** (0.000) | | | |
| Trade/GDP | | | | | | 0.999 (0.001) | | |
| FDI/GDP | | | | | | | 0.991*** (0.003) | |
| ODA/GNI | | | | | | | | 0.997 (0.004) |
| Observations | 23,502 | 23,502 | 23,502 | 23,502 | 23,502 | 18,907 | 16,994 | 15,696 |
| Country-treaty clusters | 1,849 | 1,849 | 1,849 | 1,849 | 1,849 | 1,568 | 1,514 | 1,297 |
| Number of ratifications | 1,349 | 1,349 | 1,349 | 1,349 | 1,349 | 1,083 | 1,008 | 879 |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -8797 | -8768 | -8819 | -8817 | -8785 | -6820 | -6172 | -5343 |
| Wald chi square | 351.8 | 442.6 | 389.0 | 393.2 | 426.3 | 276.0 | 280.7 | 227.7 |

Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country-treaty. Efron approximation used for tied failures. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table A4: Human rights treaty obligations and ratification, Cox model comparing the effect between demanding obligations and autocracy

| | |
|---|----------|
| Demanding obligations | 0.773*** |
| <i>(note: unit change of 15)</i> | (0.013) |
| Autocracy | 0.778*** |
| | (0.059) |
| Democratic transition | 2.018*** |
| | (0.205) |
| Basic rights respected | 0.943** |
| | (0.025) |
| Global ratification rate | 1.012*** |
| | (0.002) |
| IGO memberships (ln) | 1.511*** |
| | (0.089) |
| GDP/capita (ln) | 1.004 |
| | (0.033) |
| Observations | 23,502 |
| Country-treaty clusters | 1,849 |
| Number of ratifications | 1,349 |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -8801 |
| Wald chi square | 346.5 |
| Hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country-treaty. | |
| Efron approximation used for tied failures. | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 | |

Table A5: Human rights treaty obligations and ratification, logistic models

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Demanding obligations | 0.986*** (0.001) | 0.986*** (0.001) | 0.959*** (0.006) | 0.921*** (0.013) | 0.926*** (0.011) | 0.939*** (0.008) | 0.983*** (0.001) |
| Democracy | 1.479*** (0.106) | 1.646*** (0.134) | 2.815*** (0.475) | 2.827*** (0.641) | 2.773*** (0.601) | 2.661*** (0.527) | 1.290*** (0.109) |
| Democratic transition | 1.704*** (0.177) | 1.710*** (0.183) | 0.983 (0.176) | 1.173 (0.270) | 1.199 (0.268) | 1.231 (0.261) | 2.396*** (0.270) |
| Basic rights respected | | 0.937** (0.025) | 0.789*** (0.041) | 0.740*** (0.054) | 0.771*** (0.058) | 0.815*** (0.056) | 0.970 (0.028) |
| Global ratification rate | | | 1.058*** (0.012) | 1.105*** (0.020) | 1.098*** (0.017) | 1.086*** (0.013) | |
| IGO memberships (ln) | | | | 4.151*** (0.954) | 3.915*** (0.827) | 4.317*** (0.809) | 1.672*** (0.107) |
| GDP/capita (ln) | | | | | 0.906 (0.092) | 0.937 (0.086) | 0.996 (0.037) |
| Already ratified ICCPR | | | | | | 0.675 (0.229) | |
| Already ratified ICESCR | | | | | | 0.464** (0.161) | |
| Time polynomials included | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 25,188 | 23,706 | 23,706 | 23,502 | 23,502 | 23,502 | 23,502 |
| Country-treaty clusters | 1,867 | 1,861 | 1,861 | 1,849 | 1,849 | 1,849 | 1,849 |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -5231 | -5038 | -4927 | -4832 | -4832 | -4811 | -4954 |
| Wald chi square | 276.1 | 275.5 | 109.2 | 69.81 | 81.24 | 120.8 | 399.7 |
| Prob > chi ² | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Logit models with random effects and robust standard errors clustered by country-treaty.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Table A6: Human rights treaty obligations and ratification, logistic models

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Demanding obligations | 0.933*** (0.010) | 0.961*** (0.007) | 0.945*** (0.009) |
| Democracy | 2.602*** (0.620) | 2.190*** (0.419) | 2.338*** (0.461) |
| Democratic transition | 1.235 (0.273) | 1.146 (0.246) | 1.340 (0.282) |
| Basic rights respected | 0.782*** (0.061) | 0.914 (0.060) | 0.787*** (0.051) |
| Global ratification rate | 1.086*** (0.016) | 1.046*** (0.012) | 1.068*** (0.015) |
| IGO memberships (ln) | 3.880*** (0.791) | 2.900*** (0.489) | 2.520*** (0.465) |
| GDP/capita (ln) | 0.922 (0.093) | 0.917 (0.077) | 1.025 (0.089) |
| Judicial independence | 0.869 (0.375) | | |
| Treaties incorporated | | 2.231*** (0.330) | |
| Treaties equal or superior | | | 1.241 (0.191) |
| Time polynomials included | No | No | No |
| Observations | 22,608 | 16,616 | 22,193 |
| Country-treaty clusters | 1,828 | 1,512 | 1,824 |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -4682 | -3368 | -4661 |
| Wald chi-square | 89.87 | 108.8 | 102.6 |
| Prob > chi ² | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.
 Logit models with random effects and robust standard errors clustered by country-treaty.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Appendix B: Summary Statistics and Descriptions of Treaty-Level Variables

Table B1: Functions of clauses in global human rights treaties

| Function of the treaty clause | Freq. | Percent | Cum. |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| 1. Preamble | 33 | 2.05 | 2.05 |
| 2. General purpose or object | 68 | 4.23 | 6.29 |
| 3. Definition of treaty terms | 41 | 2.55 | 8.84 |
| 4. Treaty mechanics | 188 | 11.71 | 20.55 |
| 5. Obligation | 872 | 54.30 | 74.84 |
| 6. Limitation | 33 | 2.05 | 76.90 |
| 7. Non-derogation | 8 | 0.50 | 77.40 |
| 8. Accept jurisdiction of treaty body | 7 | 0.44 | 77.83 |
| 9. Functioning of treaty body | 294 | 18.31 | 96.14 |
| 10. Other or unclear | 62 | 3.86 | 100.00 |
| Total | 1,606 | 100.00 | |

Table B2: Does this clause create a precise or imprecise obligation?

| | Freq. | Percent | Cum. |
|--------------|------------|---------------|--------|
| Imprecise | 205 | 23.51 | 23.51 |
| Precise | 667 | 76.49 | 100.00 |
| Total | 872 | 100.00 | |

Table B3: Is this obligation weak or strong?

| | Freq. | Percent | Cum. |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| Weak | 412 | 47.25 | 47.25 |
| Strong | 460 | 52.75 | 100.00 |
| Total | 872 | 100.00 | |

Table B4: Does this clause obligate states to take domestic action?

| | Freq. | Percent | Cum. |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| No | 76 | 8.72 | 8.72 |
| Yes | 796 | 91.28 | 100.00 |
| Total | 872 | 100.00 | |

The measure for demandingness requires that the obligation be precise, strongly worded, and require domestic action. We argued in the main text that all three dimensions contribute to demandingness. However, one might argue that each dimension on its own contributes to demandingness. Table B5 shows how the treaties are ranked by removing each dimension, one at a time. Removing the domestic action requirement does not alter the treaty rankings, likely because most obligations require a domestic action (91%, see table C4). Relying only on the strength of the obligation likewise does not alter the treaty ranking, except that the ICESCR and CEDAW switch places. Not surprisingly, when we estimate all 24 survival models using strength on its own, we find that in every model, strength is negative and statistically significant. The ranking changes when the measure only uses the precision of the obligation. We estimate all 24 survival models using precision

on its own, and we find that in every model, precision is negative and statistically significant. The high degree of correlation between precision and strength shows that obligations that are strong tend also to be precise, and vice versa. When states want to design a strong obligation, they make it precise, and they tend to make precise obligations strong. Overall, there is strong correlation among each demandingness dimension.

Figure B1: Pearson correlation among demandingness dimensions




Table B5: Demandingness ranking using alternative measures

| Rank | Strong, Precise, Domestic Action | Strong, Precise | Strong | Precise |
|------|----------------------------------|-----------------|--------|---------|
| 1 | CRMW | CRMW | CRMW | CRMW |
| 2 | CED | CED | CED | CRPD |
| 3 | ICCPR | ICCPR | ICCPR | CED |
| 4 | CRC | CRC | CRC | CRC |
| 5 | CRPD | CRPD | CRPD | ICCPR |
| 6 | CAT | CAT | CAT | CEDAW |
| 7 | CEDAW | CEDAW | ICESCR | ICESCR |
| 8 | ICESCR | ICESCR | CEDAW | CERD |
| 9 | GENO | GENO | GENO | CAT |
| 10 | CERD | CERD | CERD | GENO |

Table B6: Direction of effect and p-values from the survival models using precision and strength independently to measure treaty demandingness

| Independent Variable | % Negative | % Significant (p<0.05) |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------------------|
| Number of precise obligations | 100% | 100% |
| Number of strong obligations | 100% | 100% |

Table B7: Detailed coding instructions for key variables included in analysis

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Variable Name: | art_function |
| Variable label: | General function of the treaty provision being coded. |
| Coding rules: | Choose the option that best describes the general function or content of this provision. |
| | 1 = preamble: this clause is part of the treaty's preamble |
| | 2 = purpose: this clause expresses a general purpose or object of the treaty or part of the treaty. |
| | 3 = definition of treaty language: this clause defines language or terms employed in the treaty. |

4 = treaty mechanics: this clause establishes mechanisms related to establishing the treaty itself or treaty mechanisms (signing, accession, ratification, entry into force, reporting, creation of treaty bodies).

5 = obligation: this clause creates a treaty obligation or duty for states parties.

6 = limitation:

- This provision creates limitations on the obligations contained in another provision.
- A limitation stipulates conditions under which a provision or part of it does not, or may not, apply.
- A clause that introduces a subsequent list of obligations subject to limitation should be coded as a limitation.
- Each of the provisions following the introductory limitation clause should also be coded as a limitation.

7 = non-derogation: this clause states that the treaty, or specific obligations contained in it, is non-derogable. Non-derogable clauses are obligations that cannot be suspended or for which no exceptions are possible. Non-derogation is usually stipulated in a clause to the effect that:

- “no exceptional circumstances...may be invoked...”, or
- “no derogation from...may be made...”

8 = accept jurisdiction of treaty body, court, or committee: this clause relates to states parties’ optional acceptance of the jurisdiction of a treaty committee, court, or other body (to receive submissions from other states or from individuals; to interpret the treaty; to initiate inquiries).

9 = functioning of treaty body/court/committee: this clause specifies the creation, duties, or functioning of the related committee, court, or treaty body.

10 = other or unclear: select this option only if none of the previous options applies

11 = no reservation allowed: this clause prohibits states from entering reservations, either to a specific provision or to the treaty as a whole.

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Variable name: | specific |
| Variable label: | The treaty provision creates a specific rather than a general obligation. |
| Coding rules: | Code this variable only if you entered “5, obligation” for the previous variable “art_function.” |

Choose from the drop-down options:

0 = general. A provision should be coded as “general” if it does not require or imply specifically identifiable actions on the part of the state or other actors.

1 = specific

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Variable name: | strength |
|-----------------------|-----------------|

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Variable label: | Distinguishes weaker from stronger obligations |
| Coding rules: | Code this variable only if you entered “5, obligation” for the variable “art_function.” |

0 = weak. A weak obligation is one that requires states only to attempt, or make an effort, to achieve an objective. Weak obligations express a goal or aspiration rather than concrete steps to take.

1 = strong. A strong obligation is one that requires states to take measures, achieve objectives, or guarantee rights. The language is not just of “undertaking or “seeking” but of doing. The verbs take the form of imperatives (commands).

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| Variable name: | domestic_action |
|-----------------------|------------------------|

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Variable label: | The treaty provision creates an obligation for domestic action. Not all obligations created by a treaty require domestic action. Many provisions obligate states vis-à-vis each other or some international organization. Select “yes” if the provision envisions and requires further action in the laws or institutions of the state. |
| Coding rules: | 1 = yes; the provision being coded creates an obligation for domestic action on the part of the state. The action could be executive, administrative, legislative, judicial, or a combination. The goal is to distinguish obligations created for states from obligations for states to take particular domestic measures. |

0 = no; the provision does not create an obligation for domestic action.

Appendix C: Descriptions of Covariates

Table C1 summarizes the variables and data sources used in the pooled, multivariate event history analysis. The inclusion of certain variables is straightforward: we pulled them straight from the source, unaltered (e.g. GDP per capita). Data on FDI and trade are originally sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, but we accessed the data from the International Political Economy Data Resource (Graham and Tucker 2017).

Data for IGO and INGO membership is notoriously spotty. To develop measures with comprehensive country and time coverage, we combined data on IGOs from two sources: the Correlates of War and the Union of International Associations’ *Yearbook on International Organizations*. When interior values are missing, we use linear interpolation. For the IGO membership variable, when values exist from both data sources, we take the average.

Table C1: Data and sources for pooled multivariate event history analysis

| Measure | Source | Time Coverage |
|------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| <i>Socialization</i> | | |
| IGO membership (log) | Correlates of War Project, Intergovernmental Organizations v2.3 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004) | 1815-2005 |
| | Union of International Associations’ <i>Yearbook of International Organizations</i> (Union of International Associations 2014) | 1983-2014 |
| INGO membership (log) | Union of International Associations’ <i>Yearbook of International Organizations</i> (Union of International Associations 2014) | 1983-2014 |
| <i>Democracy</i> | | |
| Democracy | (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013; Graham and Tucker 2017) | 1800-2015 |
| State repression | (Fariss 2014; Graham and Tucker 2017) | 1949-2013 |
| Transitioning democracy | (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013; Graham and Tucker 2017) | 1800-2015 |
| <i>Domestic Legal Institutions</i> | | |

| | | |
|---|---|-----------|
| Judicial independence | (Graham and Tucker 2017; Linzer and Staton 2015) | 1948-2012 |
| Treaties equal or superior | (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014) | 1789-2010 |
| Treaties incorporated | (Versteeg 2015) | 1946-2006 |
| <i>Economic Coercion / Rewards Thesis</i> | | |
| GDP per capita (log) | (Anders, Fariss, and Markowitz 2019) | 1500-2015 |
| Population (log) | (Anders, Fariss, and Markowitz 2019) | 1500-2015 |
| Urban population (log) | Correlates of War National Material Capabilities v5.0 (Graham and Tucker 2017; Singer 1987) | 1816-2012 |
| FDI (% of GDP) | (Graham and Tucker 2017; The World Bank 2016) | 1970-2015 |
| ODA (% of GNI) | (The World Bank 2016) | 1960-2016 |
| Trade (% of GDP) | (Graham and Tucker 2017; The World Bank 2016) | 1960-2015 |

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